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What effect Carter will have in the future is questionable.
Having been decided by a federal district court, the case will not
be a precedent which binds other federal courts. Although the
Carter view is still in the minority, the fairness of the result and
the acclamation of the Wilkins opinion by the American Law Insti-
tute53 may well influence other courts to adopt this ruling. Be-
cause the judicial conflict over this issue has been waged without
apparent resolution for nearly thirty years, perhaps the most expedi-
ent settlement of the question would lie in congressional action.
JEFFREY P. WHITE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATIONS
- TRESPASS STATUTES
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 38 (1966).
With the advent in the 1960's of marches, demonstrations, and
pickets by nonviolent civil rights advocates, various states have gen-
erally been frustrated by the Supreme Court and other federal courts
in their attempted use of the police power to control the protesters.'
The basic issues involved in these decisions focus upon the conflict
between the states' interest in preserving an orderly social structure
and the first amendment rights' of the demonstrators. Some states
have tried to regulate peaceful demonstrations on public property3
by charging those involved with breach of the peace, as defined by
either common law4 or statute,5 and by invoking ordinances con-
trolling the obstruction of traffic' or statutes prohibiting courthouse
picketing by those intending to impede "the administration of jus-
tice" or influence a "judge [orl juror . . . in the discharge of his
duty."7  The United States Supreme Court, through the decisions
of a fluctuating majority, has consistently reversed such convictions
due either to the vagueness8 or discriminatory application' of the
statute authorizing the arrest or the attempt by the police to disre-
gard prior interpretations of a precisely drawn statute's meaning."
Despite the results of these prior decisions, the Supreme Court may
have given the states a solution to their problem by its recent deci-
sion in Adderley v. Florida."
5 3 ALI JURISDICTON STUDY § 1312(d), comment at 79-80 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1966).
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In 1963, the picketing of segregated Tallahassee theaters re-
sulted in the arrest of a number of Negro college students and a
1 This comment is concerned with those decisions of the Supreme Court which in-
volve civil rights demonstrations on public property as opposed to cases involvingprotests against private businesses, i.e, the sit-in cases, which involve a different set ofproblems. E.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Bell v. Maryland, 378U.S. 226 (1964); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963); Lombard v.Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963);
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
2 The proposition that the rights of free assembly, free speech, and freedom to peti-
tion the government for redress of grievances are protected from state interference by
the fourteenth amendment is well understood, thus obviating the necessity of discussing
the development of the law in this area. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359(1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925).
3 The term "public land," as usually defined by statute, is not meant to include lands
reserved for special governmental or public purposes. 73 C.J.S. Public Lands § 1(1951); 26 Fi.A. JuR. Public Lands § 2 (1959). Cf. FLA. STAT. § 821.20 (1961).
However, in this comment the phrases "public land" and "public property" will be
used to encompass property which, for example, if controlled by a city would be con-
sidered public property in the broadest sense of the word. 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corpor-
ations § 950 (1950). Such property would include sidewalks and land surroundinggovernmental buildings, whether controlled by the city, county, or state.
4 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). Demonstrators assembled atthe state capitol to express their grievances concerning the general treatment of Negroes
in South Carolina. After being told by the police that they had the right to enter thegrounds, the demonstrators were confronted by a group of three hundred white persons.Despite a lack of any outward expression of the crowd's feelings, the demonstrators
were ordered to leave within fifteen minutes. A refusal to obey this order resulted in
their arrest for the common law offense of breach of the peace - an offense which the
state court admitted was "not susceptible of exact definition." Id. at 234. The Court
overruled the convictions because of this vagueness and the fact that the demonstrators
were arrested simply because they drew a crowd and not because actual public disorder
existed. Id. at 237-38.
5 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
6 Id. at 542.
7 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).8 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). This case involved the same facts as Cox
v. Louisiana, supra note 7, but was reported separately. The appellant led two thousand
demonstrators on a march near the state courthouse where a number of picketers from
a previous demonstration were being held. Following police orders they walked onthe sidewalk until Cox told them to leave and "sit-in" at a local lunch counter. This
remark so aroused the gathering crowd of white citizens that the police ordered the
marchers to disperse and then used tear gas when their demand was refused. Cox was
subsequently arrested and charged, in part, with breaching the peace as defined by the
following statute:
Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circum-
stances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby... crowds
or congregates with others.., in or upon.. a public street... or upon a
public sidewalk ... and who fails or refuses to disperse and move on ... when
ordered to do so by any law enforcement officer.., or by any other authorized
person... shall be guilty of disturbing the peace. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:103.1
(Supp. 1966).
The Supreme Court decided that the circumstances did not constitute a breach ofthe peace and that the statute was unconstitutional "in that it sweeps within its broad
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march by two hundred others to the Leon County jail grounds in
protest of both the arrests and state and local policies of segregation.
Upon their arrival at the jail entrance, the marchers, in obedience to
a deputy sheriff's order, moved to the driveway and various grassy
areas upon the grounds until commanded by the later-arriving sher-
iff to leave the area entirely because they were trespassing upon
county property. A refusal by Harriet Adderley and thirty-one
others to obey this order resulted in their arrest and conviction for
the statutory offense of trespassing upon the property of another
with a "malicious and mischievous intent.
' 12
In a five-to-four opinion upholding the convictions, the Court
supported its decision by first determining that the cases of Edwards
v. South Carolina" and Cox v. Louisiana'4 were not controlling.
Edwards, which involved demonstrators on state capitol grounds
who were unconstitutionally arrested for allegedly breaching the
peace, as defined by common law, 5 was distinguished because: (1)
jail grounds are usually not open to the general public, whereas the
capitol grounds are traditionally made available to all;' 6 (2) the
demonstrators in Edwards entered the capitol grounds through a
public driveway after receiving permission from a state officer, while
in Adderley the marchers entered the jail grounds without permis-
sion through a driveway normally used only for jail purposes;' 7 and
scope activities that are constitutionally protected free speech and assembly." Cox v.
Louisiana, supra, at 552. The majority felt that the first part of the statute dealing with
a refusal to obey an order to disperse was constitutional but that the statute, as a whole,
could result in an arrest of those who simply expressed unpopular views. Id. at 551-52.
9 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). Sit-in demonstrators at a public li-
brary, after having been waited on, were ordered to leave. Their refusal to do so re-
sulted in their arrest for breaching the peace under the same statute involved in Cox v.
Louisiana, supra note 8. In reversing the convictions the majority stated that even if
the petitioners' action were within the scope of the statute, they would be required to
assess the constitutional impact of its application, and "since the statute was deliberately
... applied solely to terminate the reasonable, orderly, and limited exercise of the right
to protest the unconstitutional segregation of a public facility,' the Court stated that
"interference with this right so exercised, by state action is intolerable under our Con-
stitution." Id. at 142. It should be noted that the majority was influenced by the fact
that the only people in the library at the time of the "disturbance" were library em-
ployees. Ibid.
10 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
11385 U.S. 39 (1966) (Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas, J.J. and Warren, C.J., dis-
senting).
12 LA. STAT. S 821.18 (1965).
Is 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
14 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
15 For a discussion of the case, see note 4 supra.
16 385 U.S. at 41.
17 Ibid.
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(3) the Florida trespass statute did not suffer for vagueness as evi-
denced by the specific conduct it proscribed, the adequate notice it
gave, and the term €'malicious and mischievous intent" which nar-
rowed its scope and clarified its meaning. 8 Cox v. Louisiana was
distinguished solely on the ground that it also dealt with an uncon-
stitutionally vague statute. 9
Once these decisions had been distinguished, the majority had
little difficulty in determining that all the necessary elements of
trespass had been proven by the state.20 Justification for holding
that the petitioners' constitutional rights to freedom of speech, as-
sembly, and petition had not been violated focused on the lack of
access to the jail grounds by the general public,"' the fact that the
sheriff's sole objection to the demonstration was its occurrence on
county jail property,22 and the fact that the right to picket, not being
an absolute right, may be controlled by a state through its authority
to "control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondis-
criminatory purpose.""
The dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas criticized
the majority's treatment of this situation as an ordinary trespass or
picketing problem rather than one concerned with the first amend-
ment right of petitioning the government for the redress of griev-
ances.' Arguing that such petitioning, logically held outside a jail
which housed prisoners believed to have been unjustly arrested,
"should not be condemned as tactics of obstruction and harassment
as long as the assembly and petition" were peaceable, Justice
Douglas pointed out that the jail routine was in no way disrupted,
that traffic on the driveway was not blocked,2" and that the demon-
181d. at 42-43.
19 Id. at 42.
20 Id. at 46. This included evidence that the petitioners were told they were tres-
passing, refused to leave within ten minutes after the order, and only those on the jail
grounds after the ten-minute period were arrested. Ibid.
21 Id. at 47. In objecting to this construction of the facts, the minority argued that
the state made no claim that the public had generally been excluded from the jail
grounds. Id. at 52 (dissenting opinion).
22 Id. at 47. On this point, the minority argued that this lack of concern over the
ideas expressed by the demonstrators is stated by most police in these cases just before
jailing the demonstrators. Id. at 56 (dissenting opinion).
28 Id. at 48.
24 Id. at 52.
25 Id. at 51. The minority felt the majority discounted the fact that most picket
lines are directed against private interests and that there was a complete absence of "No
Trespassing" signs on the jail premises. Id. at 52.
2 0 Ibid. The dissent pointed out that only the sheriff and deputy sheriff made any
attempt to use the driveway, and they experienced absolutely no difficulty in parking.
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strators exhibited a complete willingness to relocate themselves on
other parts of the jail grounds when requested to do so." While
agreeing that places such as courthouses or legislative galleries
might be improper areas for the voicing of grievances, the minority
expressed the view that this did not support the conclusion that "all
public places are off limits to people with grievances" or that a
"custodian" of public property may, at his discretion, determine
when a public place may be used by those who wish to communi-
cate their ideas.2"
Since Adderley presents the first Supreme Court decision up-
holding the conviction of civil rights demonstrators on public prop-
erty, a brief evaluation must be made of the various positions ex-
pressed by different members of the Court in order to place Adderley
in its proper perspective. Generally, the members of the Court
agree that participants in any form of group demonstration upon
highways, streets, or other public facilities would enjoy more re-
stricted first amendment freedoms than would individuals under
the same circumstances. 9 There also seems to be a consensus that
peaceful demonstrators may not be arrested for the vague common
law offense of breaching the peace, since the police officer's discre-
tionary power to define activity coming within the terms of the of-
fense may easily result in the arrest of those who simply express
unpopular views."0
With respect to statutory offenses, however, a chasm develops
within the Court over what constitutes a statute specific enough
constitutionally to support the arrest of nonviolent demonstrators
and over what type of conduct, if any, is outside the purview of even
a narrowly drawn, nondiscriminatorily applied statute. While prior
to Adderley a majority of the Court had consistently reversed state
convictions of civil rights demonstrators, there persisted a lack of
unanimity as to the rationale for these decisions. All of the Justices
seem to agree that some type of "precise and narrowly drawn regu-
Also, the majority's view that the demonstrators blocked a vendor's truck, thereby forc-
ing him to stay at the jail until they were dispersed, was countered by the argument
that it could as easily be assumed that the vendor was staying in the building so as not
to miss the excitement. Id. at 51-52.
27 Id. at 52.
2 8 Id. at 54.
29 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
30 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). Mr. Justice Clark dissented
on the ground that the state's duty to protect society would support any action it took
against those whose peaceful demonstrating had so aroused a crowd of on-lookers that
a strong possibility of danger existed. Id. at 238-39. The contrary argument would
be that the policemen's duty is to protect the demonstrators and not vice-versa.
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latory statute evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific
conduct be limited or proscribed" would be constitutional if applied
to peaceful marchers on public property." Only Mr. Justice Clark
has supported the constitutionality of an arrest on a public sidewalk,
the arrest being based upon a statute making it a misdemeanor to
refuse to disperse upon orders of any person in authority when such
an individual feels that circumstances exist which could lead to
a breach of the peace or that a group intends to provoke such a
breach.82 However, in a later case, four dissenting Justices, led by
Mr. Justice Black, strongly argued that such a statute, while too
broad to be applied to demonstrators near a courthouse, was specific
enough to support a conviction of sit-in demonstrators in a public
library, since the library was designed to serve a dearly defined
function which the demonstrators disrupted through their conduct.
Thus, these four Justices would hold the same statute to be both
constitutional and unconstitutional, depending upon the circum-
stances in which it was applied.8"
On the other hand, even where there was complete agreement
as to the constitutional specificity of a statute, a five-to-four decision
resulted when the state's method of enforcement was evaluated.
Cox v. Louisiana concerned a statute making it a misdemeanor to
31 Id. at 236. The concept that some form of statutory control, if properly defined,
could be used against the demonstrators caused some very basic problems for the ma-
jority of the Court prior to Adderley. The Court had inferred in dictum that it would
accept a narrowly drawn statute such as one controlling access to parking lots on state
capitol grounds during business hours. Ibid. However, when confronted with a
situation in which the actions of a large mass of demonstrators were clearly prohibited
by a narrow regulatory statute - one approved by the American Bar Association - the
majority reversed the convictions of the marchers because after the police told them
that the statute would allow demonstrations within a certain distance of a courthouse,
this decision was revoked. The Court, in rationalizing its decision, stated that the opin-
ion was not to be interpreted "as sanctioning riotous conduct in any form or demonstra-
tions however peaceful which conflict with properly drawn statutes . . . designed to
preserve law and order." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965). Therefore, if
the majority in Cox actually believed that a specific statute could be used by the state to
control civil rights demonstrators, they had the perfect opportunity to so hold in that
case, since the police were in a position to honestly decide that the march would have
to be disbanded due to the attitude of the crowd.
82 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 589-91 (1965) (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice
Clark would also allow the states to arrest demonstrators whenever clear evidence of
danger exists even though the protest is completely peaceful. See Edwards. v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 244 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
33 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (Black, Clark, Harlan, and Stew-
art, J.J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Black argued that the statute only reached specific
conduct, that is, the refusal to obey an authorized person. This was distinguished from
the situation in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), where the statute was
so broad that it could cover any act which aroused the onlookers in the vicinity of the
demonstration. 383 U.S. at 159.
84 379 U.S. 559 (1965). (Black, Clark, Harlan, and White, JJ., dissenting).
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parade "near" a courthouse with intent to interfere with the admin-
istration of justice. Although all members of the Court agreed
that the marchers desired to hinder a judicial proceeding, the ma-
jority vacated the conviction upon discovery that the arrests had
been made after the demonstrators were told by a police officer
that they were far enough away from the courthouse so as not to
come under the terms of the statute.35
These cases reveal the fundamental conflict within the Court
between the approach advocated by Mr. Justice Black, who would
allow all picketing to be disallowed by the state as long as the gov-
erning statute would be applicable to all groups, 6 and the opposing
view that the enforcement of statutory prohibitions against civil
rights demonstrators must be of such primary importance to the
state that without such prohibitions an immediate threat of danger
would exist. Underlying the latter position, as expressed by Mr.
Justice Fortas in Brown v. Louisiana,' is the belief that actions by
demonstrators which are dearly within the scope of a regulatory
statute would not support an arrest if the sole purpose for enforcing
the statute were to limit protest against segregationist practices by a
state or one of its agents."8 Mr. Justice Black's approach seems to
overlook the possible anti-Negro feelings of the police which may
cause an arrest and instead place emphasis upon a state's right to
control the conduct of all demonstrators and to define nondiscrimi-
natory controls over state property.3 "
The result of this conflict was the Adderley v. Florida decision
in which Mr. Justice Black's "conduct approach" finally became the
majority opinion. However, this does not mean that a sudden rush
by the various states to adopt broad statutes outlawing all forms of
demonstration will be supported by the Court. Adderley, if applied
strictly to its facts, will support only the arrests of demonstrators
who express their opinions in places controlled by the state or its
35 Id. at 570-71. In the dissent Mr. Justice Black argued that the policeman had no
legal right to give permission to commit an unlawful act and that, in any event, he later
revoked the permission. Id. at 582-83.
36 See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (dissenting opinion);
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
37 383 U.S. 139 (1966).
38 Id. at 142.
39 See id at 166 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Black has always advocated the
absolute first amendment rights of the individual when confronted by the state, but his
view that the conduct of picketers does not come within the first amendment guarantees
has also been rather consistent. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490 (1949); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865 (1960); Reich, Mr.
Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARv. L. REv. 673 (1963).
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agents in which the public has been notified that the area is open
only to those with official business. Nevertheless, serious problems
can still be created even with a strict interpretation of Adderley -
and they certainly will be if a broader approach is attempted - if
the states attempt to limit areas of demonstration solely through a
general trespass statute.
It is the type of statute involved in Adderley that presents the
most unfortunate aspect of the decision. Little if any evidence exists
to support the conclusion that the various states, including Florida,
have considered utilizing an omnibus trespass statute to safeguard
public property.40 Furthermore, the term "property of another"
connotes private as opposed to state or public property as evidenced
by its use in trespass statutes involving only private property. These
factors, plus the complete lack of any definition in the statute as to
the particular types of property involved, would seem to leave in
the hands of law enforcement officials the same discretion in deter-
mining the limitations of the demonstrators' first amendment rights
that the Court has disallowed in prior decisions. Without statutory
direction as to the type of public property covered by the statute, a
policeman's determination of a statutory violation may foreseeably
be as subjective as were the misdemeanor charges in the "breach-
of-peace" cases.
In all fairness to the majority in Adderley, there would seem to
be no valid or logical way to interpret the decision so that the statute
in question, or even one more narrowly drawn, could cover property
as public as the sidewalks leading to the state capitol.4 However,
as emphasized in the dissent, a very serious problem can arise when
a building with surrounding grounds that traditionally are open to
the general public, such as the state capitol, is located next to a jail
4 0 Those Florida trespass statutes which deal specifically with state property do not
mention the term "property of another"; rather, they deal with various specific uses of
the land such as the removal of trees or the establishment of a homestead. FLA. STAT.
§§ 821.19-.21 (1961). Furthermore, in 32 FLA. JutR. Trespass § 16, at 206 n.17
(1960), the only authority cited which refers to the omnibus trespass statute is an
Opinion of the Attorney General stating that the statute applies to an individual park-
ing in a posted private lot. See also Ervin, Freedom of Assembly and Racial Demon-
strations, 10 CLEV.-MA- L. RE . 88 (1961). The author was the Attorney General of
Florida at the time he wrote the article. It is interesting to note that in part IV of the
article, entitled "When do Racial Demonstrations Become Unlawful Assemblies?," the
author never mentions the use of a general trespass statute as a means for stopping the
demonstrations.
41 This would seem evident from the majority's emphasis on the alleged fact that
the public had not been allowed to use the jail grounds before for their own personal
use or enjoyment. 385 U.S. at 47.
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or other traditionally inaccessible placeY The majority did not
attempt to resolve this problem and, by not doing so, has placed the
states in the precarious position of having a Supreme Court decision
in their favor without receiving any indication of its scope.
It is submitted that if the states begin to enforce their general
trespass ordinances toward lands where the public has traveled, the
Court will have little difficulty returning to the view that conduct
within the scope of a statute may not be condemned if it can be
shown that an arrest was made solely to hinder a demonstrator from
expressing his viewpoint against segregation," especially if there is
a lack of warning that the statute is being used to punish previously
constitutionally premissible behavior.44 Thus, if the states desire to
use trespass ordinances, or statutes involving breach of the peace
or the like, they would be well advised to enact laws dealing with
somewhat specific lands and buildings, for they cannot expect fac-
tual situations as favorable as Adderley to arise in every instance.
ROBERT B. MEANY
421d. at 53.
43 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966).
44 Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1963).
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